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Thomas McCarthy’s Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human
Development is an intriguing and important book; moreover,
despite its heavy themes and its fine scholarship, it is
extremely readable. And it is very timely. The questions it
takes up are some of the most pressing of our age:
globalization,
international
distributive
justice,
and
sustainable economic development in particular. Its central
problematic
concerns
the
detrimental
effects
of
developmental thinking as a core feature of modernity. The
book seeks, says McCarthy, to make “a contribution to the
critical history of the present” (2), but it does not stop with
critical analysis; McCarthy strives to reconstruct the concept
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of “development” in the interest of securing human rights
and establishing global justice.
Developmental thinking is a fundamental aspect of
modernity, McCarthy asserts, but it is not peculiar to
modernity; the ancients (famously, Aristotle) had explicit
theories of development. For the ancients, however,
development was a matter of each being fulfilling its nature
in the course of its existence. Time itself was not progressive;
rather, it was cyclic. Development occurred only at the level
of the individual entity, and each entity repeated the same
basic developmental process according to its species. It was
Christianity that introduced the notion of the ever-new
moment in its story of the temporal progression from
Creation, to Fall, to Redemption, to Last Judgment (134).
However, Christianity’s narrative was not progressive in the
sense of improving the state of the world; the world was but a
staging area for a progression that was purely spiritual. In
modernity, by contrast, the notion of development is
reconceived as material human progress, the gradual
improvement of industry, technology, knowledge, and social
and governmental institutions. This is the milieu in which
Kant conceived of the inevitable social and political
progression of history by natural means (conflicts generated
and resolved by our natural unsocial sociability) coupled (and
in tension) with the unpredictability of a history that is the
domain of human freedom. McCarthy returns us to Kant’s
work as both the beginning of a modernity whose
developmental thinking now imperils and impoverishes
millions and as the source of a potential rethinking of
development toward global justice for all.
Given space constraints, I must condense McCarthy’s
reasoning, but basically it is this: (1) Developmental thinking,
like development itself, is a fact. For a variety of reasons, we
cannot simply abandon it and think otherwise. As McCarthy
puts it toward the end of the book, “developmental thinking
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is irrepressible…” (242). That being the case, (2) we must
confront developmental thinking as it has played out in our
history and work through the damage it has done, the
injustice, the violence, and in particular the racism that it has
generated and furthered, and that it has used to further itself.
If we do not do so, those elements will continue to structure
our world, with all their damaging effects, into the future. (3)
Embracing development, without its racism and imperialism,
etc., and without the supposition of religious or metaphysical
guarantees of success, requires hope for a better future, one in
which global justice reigns and human misery is truly
minimized. But such hope is hard to come by these days,
especially after all the atrocities that have been committed in
the name of human betterment and emancipation. Where will
we get it? (4) We will not get it through some grand totalizing
theory of history. As Kant said, history cannot be thought in
its totality through speculative reason, precisely because it is
a domain of freedom. Our hope lies, rather, in reflective
judgment informed by empirical observation and guided by
practical concern. But we may indeed hope, McCarthy insists,
and in fact it is morally imperative that we do so.

First, is it the case that development and developmental
thinking are facts? McCarthy is careful to qualify any appeal
to factuality with a clear account of facts as products of
interpretation. Hence, by “fact” I take him to mean simply
that developmental thinking in one form or another is
pervasive in the history of our society (insofar as we know
that history) and is, for that and many other reasons,
inescapable for us for the foreseeable future. There is no
thinking otherwise at this juncture. And thus it is also
inescapable
that
we
perceive
development
and
developmental thinking in the work and actions of our
predecessors.
From a Foucauldian perspective, I agree with this view,
although probably not for the reasons that McCarthy holds it
(if, indeed, he does). Development is a fundamental feature of
modernity, and we are products of it. As products of
disciplinary institutions and practices, we are developmental
through and through. Foucault never argued that we could
cease to be developmental subjects, only that we could resist
developmental normalization by striving to decouple
discipline’s cultivation of capacities from its intensification of
docility. Disciplined development can intensify resistance to
domination; it can decrease docility. On this point, I believe
McCarthy and Foucault are fellow travelers. At some points
in the text, however, McCarthy veers uncomfortably close to
making ontological claims about development and to
conflating a variety of fairly different processes under that
one term (see chapter 7, esp. section V). I do not think the
only alternative to progressive development is sheer,
atemporal difference. Whether our example is the growth and
decay of a living entity, the “advance” of science, or the
complexification of a social system, we observe changes that,
while not merely random across time, also need not be
characterized at the outset as “progress.” Temporality can be
unidirectional and irreversible (thus, change is not mere
differing) without being thereby progressive in any but the

I am very sympathetic with McCarthy’s concerns. I believe his
location of much of the modern world’s ills in our persistent
belief in progressive development on a global scale is apt, and
I am impressed with his range of historical knowledge on the
subject. Developmental thinking needs forceful philosophical
critique, and I am grateful that someone with McCarthy’s
erudition and sensitivity has undertaken the project. It is,
however, an enormous project, and McCarthy’s treatment of
it is unlikely to answer all the questions and allay all the
concerns that we might have. In the remaining space allotted
to me, I want to raise some of those concerns and questions in
the hope that McCarthy and his readers will take them up in
future work. (Nothing I say below should be taken to
diminish the accomplishments of the book as it stands.)
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barest sense of the term. It is important, historically and
politically, to be careful to keep even small distinctions in the
meaning of “development” in different contexts in mind.
Otherwise analysis becomes normative much too
prematurely. Development and developmental thinking may
be facts, but they are most likely an array of facts in a variety
of historically emerging deployments.

embedded in our conception of the world as developmental—
and in particular as economically and technologically
developmental—we will perpetuate terrible injustice. We
must confront our own histories, face the injustices that our
predecessors’ actions and our current institutions inflict,
and—difficult though it will be—strip our developmental
thinking of these dangerous and deeply injurious aspects.

Second, I want to affirm McCarthy’s claim that racism is an
inherent, not an incidental, characteristic of modernity and
that, therefore, it must be worked through rather than simply
disavowed. Despite the legal gains that minorities have made
in the US over the last fifty or sixty years, despite the
decolonization of much of the world, and despite the fact that
most white people do not actively and explicitly embrace
racist doctrines anymore, racism persists in entrenched
practices and institutions and, as McCarthy makes
abundantly clear, in the very way we think. A century ago,
racism was upheld by biological theory and “fact.” That is no
longer so; modern genetics does not support the division of
humanity into distinct races (5). However, because race was
never simply a biology concept, and, because the
developmental aspects of biological racism can easily be
shifted onto concepts like “cultural development” (as well as
“cultural pathology”), many of the very same assumptions
about many of the very same groups of people can be and are
routinely made. African Americans are no longer considered
to be incapable of stable family life and democratic selfgovernment because they are Negroes; rather, their culture(s)
are not sufficiently developed to support psychological
maturation and independence (12). McCarthy calls this
phenomenon “neoracism,” and he argues that it undergirds a
“neoimperialism” characteristic of US foreign and military
policy, as well as the practices of other Western powers and
their conjoint institutions, such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
Organization. If we fail to acknowledge how deeply racism is

But, as already noted, McCarthy declares that we must not
give up on developmental thinking altogether. Instead we
“should construct a critical theory of development, at a higher
level of reflexivity, which takes into account and tries to avoid
historical distortions and misuses of developmental thinking”
(242). My concern is that, even with disaggregation of
“various domains, processes, strands, and logics of
development” and with acceptance of “a multiplicity of
hybrid forms of modernization” (242), degree of development
will still correlate with degree of worth. As long as
development is valued, I suspect, this will be true. And
whatever is not deemed well- or highly-developed will be
disvalued, shunned, or targeted for elimination. Modernity
itself is conceived as a developmental stage, is it not? As such
it is supposedly better than whatever preceded it. This is why
we moderns tend to believe that all the world must
modernize, even if we accept that different regions may
become and then be modern in different ways. While I agree
with McCarthy that there is “pressing need for organized
collective action on behalf of the poorest and most vulnerable
societies” (226), I am not persuaded that we must think in
terms of developing those societies (or helping them to
develop) as we organize our response to their needs. Such
societies have a multiplicity of needs, but it is not obvious
that among those needs there is always a need for something
accurately labeled “development.” We must be cautious in
our presumptions; it will not do to widen or pluralize the
concept of “development” or “modernity” to encompass all
the economic or political needs that such societies evince.
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Finally, is it true that in order to work toward global justice
we must have hope that global justice can be achieved? I
appreciate the note of pragmatism sounded here; certainly no
one wants to commit themselves to a cause clearly lost from
the outset. However, I do not believe that people generally
approach moral questions in speculative terms—that is,
regardless of the current rational-choice-theoretic craze in
economic and ethical theory, I think what moves most people
to moral action is the draw of another’s need, not a
calculation about the likelihood of ultimate success.

morally imperative for people to hope for any such future,
however; if anything is morally imperative, it is courage,
along with a bone-deep, non-logical and non-metaphysical
belief in human equality.

Every few months, I give money to an organization in South
Dakota that provides food and clothing to people living on
the Sioux reservations there. I have no illusion that my gifts
make up for four hundred years of imperialism and genocide
perpetrated against Native American peoples. Furthermore, I
know that many of the people fed this month will be hungry
next month, and those who get clothing this winter will next
winter once again be cold. It would be wonderful if I could
change the world, right the old wrongs and create a future
that would be better than today. But even if I cannot do that, I
will still help. It is not because I hope for a more just future; it
is because I know that right now there are people who are
hungry and people who are cold. Hope is not a prerequisite
for giving.
Whenever possible, I want to do things to bring about a more
just future. But even if I knew for sure that a more just future
was impossible, I would not stop responding to the needs of
those around me, including long-term needs for secure
infrastructure, meaningful work, and political liberty. I would
not stop fighting against bullies and bigots, big and small. I
would not stop trying to alleviate suffering. I would not stop
listening and caring. To do so would be to stop living.
Of course, a more just future is possible, even if the possibility
of a persistent state of global justice is remote. It is not
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